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A. BACKGROUND OF THE BIOLOGICAL THREAT 
The effectiveness of biological agents is a difficult topic to measure in military 
affairs.  Biological Warfare has been a part of human conflict for centuries.  Throughout 
history biological agents have been utilized on a tactical level to decimate resistance to 
military actions.  Some examples range from such primitive methods as hurling dead 
bodies infected with plague over castle walls during sieges, and contaminating water 
supplies with dead animals, to more sophisticated methods such as dropping plague 
infected fleas over civilian populations or mailing anthrax-filled letters to specifically 
targeted leaders.  Biological agents as strategic weaponry have only been contemplated 
seriously over the past several decades, mainly in a capacity to deter aggressors or to 
fulfill terrorist aims. 
Until recently, the delivery and types of biological agents have been relatively 
restricted.  In the “pre-biotechnology revolution” era (pre-twentieth century) biological 
warfare was rudimentary; armies utilized what agents were naturally available to them.  
The successful employment of a biological weapon entailed as much risk to the attacker 
(with the exception of previous immunity) as to the defender and with little 
understanding of the true nature of the organism utilized.  Today, biotechnology has 
allowed scientists to handle and manipulate agents reliably, as well as to develop 
stabilizing techniques for conventional military employment, thus reducing risk of 
accidental exposure while increasing the success of dissemination techniques.  Nations 
such as Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom 





                                                 
1  Judith Miller, Stephen Engleberg and William Broad, GERMS: Biological weapons and Americas Secret 
War (New York:Simon & Schuster, 2001) 38. 
2 
1. Historical Effectiveness of Biological Warfare 
Evidence of the effects of biological warfare on militaries and society as a whole 
throughout history is a long and sad tale.  Until World War II, more victims of war died 
of war-borne microbes than of battle wounds.  The winners of past wars were not always 
the armies with the best generals and weapons, but were often merely those bearing the 
nastiest germs to transmit to their enemy.  Perhaps the greatest example of this is the 
Spanish conquest of the New World, the introduction of smallpox decimated Aztec and 
Inca resistance2.  Biological warfare conducted during World War II reveals events such 
as an outbreak of tularemia in Stalingrad in 1942 resulted in one hundred thousand cases 
targeted at German panzer troops3.  This alarming rate of tularemia was a ten fold 
increase in natural cases for the region and was claimed to be a significant role in halting 
the German armies advance into Russia.  In addition, thousands of Chinese civilians were 
killed by the Japanese Unit 731 in biological attacks using anthrax, typhoid, and plague. 
 
2. Biological Threat in the Twentieth Century 
The proliferation of dual use technologies is a complicated issue that I have 
chosen to address in this thesis.  There have been studies connecting current trends in 
biotechnology with the current biological threat4.  This thesis is not intended to duplicate 
these works, but rather to illustrate the consequences of sharing information pertaining to 
biotechnology in an open forum, such as the internet, with little to no controls in place to 
monitor the use of that information.  The current biotechnology revolution poses a 
significant threat to today’s security environment.  The use of biotechnology is difficult 
to monitor with any degree of specificity and products resulting from genetic 
manipulation may be nearly impossible to trace.  Potential actors that would be capable 
of threatening the U.S. with BW agents reads as a “who’s who” list of nations that have 
displayed antagonism towards the U.S. (Iraq, North Korea, China, Russia, and Iran).  
                                                 
2 Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies (New York: Norton, 1999) 197-
211 
3 Ken Alibek, Biohazard (New York: Dell, 1999) 30. 
4 British Medical Association, Biotechnology Weapons and Humanity (Amsterdam: Hardwood Academic, 
1999) 
3 
However, it is the list of terrorist organizations seeking BW capabilities that concerns 
U.S. security professionals today5. 
 
3. U.S. Involvement 
The history of U.S. involvement with biological agents (as a concerted 
institutional effort) has been relatively short.  The first diplomatic attempt at limiting 
biological warfare was the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibiting of the Use in War of 
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.  
This treaty prohibited the use of biological weapons. [Ref. 1]  U.S. involvement in 
biological weapons development began in 1943 at Camp Detrick and rapidly expanded 
through World War II and into the Cold War.  Officially disbanded in 1969 by President 
Nixon the U.S. biological warfare unit had competed with the Soviet Union for 
supremacy in an arms race that produced some of the most deadly organisms known to 
humanity.  In an effort to reduce the threat posed by biological warfare the U.S. played an 
integral role in ratifying the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention that 
prohibited the possession of deadly biological agents except for defensive research6.  
While the Biological Weapons Convention prohibits possession of deadly biological 
agents it has not effectively addressed the regulatory methods of controlling the 
technology that could potentially make biological agents such a terrible weapon. 
 
B. THE THREAT POSED BY BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS IN TODAY’S 
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
The recent anthrax attacks in the Unites States have served to address the problem 
biological agents pose to the security of our nation and raise public awareness.  This 
wave of attacks has been the rallying call for many biological warfare specialists who 
have cautioned governments on the danger posed by biological agents.  In the words of 
Joshua Lederberg “Individuals can make war with these new weapons.”[Ref. 2]  Even 
though the perpetrator has yet to be apprehended these attacks serve as a model for future 
                                                 
5 The Worldwide Biological Warfare Weapons Threat, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
2001) 14. 
4 
terrorist employment strategies for biological agents.  The longer it takes the U.S. to 
prosecute the responsible member(s) the more relevant these attacks will become in the 
future.  Aum Shinrikyo’s attempts at deploying anthrax in Japan and the Rajneeshees 
deployment of salmonella in Oregon are just a taste of what organizations are willing to 
embark upon for a cause. 
The effectiveness of biological agents in warfare have been touted throughout the 
world as being a more capable and less expensive7 alternative than nuclear or chemical 
weapons.  Table 1 illustrates this comparison. 
 
Weapon System 
Effect (number of 
deaths) 
1.0 Mt. hydrogen bomb 570,000-1,900,000 
1,000 kg Sarin nerve gas   
     (a)  Clear, sunny day, light breeze 300-700 
     (b)  Overcast day or night, moderate wind 400-800 
     (c) Clear, calm night 3,000-8,000 
100 kg anthrax spores   
     (a)  Clear, sunny day, light breeze 130,000-460,000 
     (b)  Overcast day or night, moderate wind 420,000-1,400,000 
     (c) Clear, calm night 1,000,000-3,000,000 
 
Table 1.   The Effects of Attacks with Weapons of Mass Destruction. After Ref. [3]. 
 
However, a paradox exists within the medical and scientific communities on the 
development of these weapons of mass destruction.  Prior to, during and after World War 
I, nations embarked on biological weapons programs basically out of fear of other 
nations8.  This competition to support the defense of one’s nation was a powerful impetus 
for expansion of scientific research in the field of offensive biological warfare.  As an 
illustration of this impetus felt by “legitimate” scientists conducting research with a 
                                                                                                                                                 
6Judith Miller, Stephen Engleberg and William Broad, GERMS: Biological weapons and Americas Secret 
War (New York:Simon & Schuster, 2001) 69. 
7 In 1969 U.N. experts estimated that the cost of producing mass casualties per square kilometer were as 
follows:  biological-$1 per square kilometer; chemical (nerve agent)-$600 per square kilometer; nuclear-
$800 per square kilometer.  Richard Danzig, “Biological Warfare a Nation at Risk—a Time to Act.”  The 
Strategic Forum 58 (1996). 
8 Judith Miller, Stephen Engleberg and William Broad, GERMS: Biological weapons and Americas Secret 
War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001) 38-65. 
5 
purpose of developing a weapon of mass destruction the following excerpt were taken by 
two Cold War scientists, one Soviet the other American: 
 
…I liked the work.  I discovered an affinity for the meticulous processes 
involved in culturing organisms.  The challenge of manipulating the tiny 
worlds that appeared under my microscope engaged me more intensely 
than anything I had ever done before…I knew that the results of my 
studies could be used to kill people, but I couldn’t figure out how to 
reconcile this knowledge with the pleasure I derived from research.  
[Ref. 4] 
 
At the time we were doing this, the objective was to solve the problem and 
not consider the philosophical ramification of what we were doing.     
[Ref. 5] 
 
This illustration of the justification processes scientists go through is a very useful 
tool.  The excerpts point out that justification for a scientist is based on a perception of a 
threat.  It is the motives scientists maintain that may be the true threat with regard to the 
proliferation of biological warfare techniques. 
 
1. U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review Threat Analysis 
The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review states the following about the current 
biological threat: 
 
Increasing proliferation of CBRNE weapons and ballistic missiles.  
The pervasiveness of proliferation in an era of globalization has increased 
the availability of technologies and expertise needed to create the military 
means to challenge directly the United States and its allies and friends.  
This includes the spread of CBRNE9 weapons and their means of delivery, 
as well as advanced conventional weapons. In particular, the pace and 
scale of recent ballistic missile proliferation has exceeded earlier 
intelligence estimates and suggests these challenges may grow at a faster 
pace than previously expected. Likewise, the biotechnology revolution 
holds the probability of increasing threats of biological warfare. 
                                                 
9 CBRNE is Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Energy. 
6 
 
And further states: 
 
Increasing potential for miscalculation and surprise.  
Together, these military-technical trends create an increased potential for 
miscalculation and surprise. In recent years, the United States has been 
surprised by the speed with which other states have progressed in 
developing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. In the 
future, it is unlikely that the United States will be able accurately to 
predict how successfully other states will exploit the revolution in military 
affairs, how rapidly potential or actual adversaries will acquire CBRNE 
weapons and ballistic missiles, or how competitions in space and cyber 
space will develop.[Ref. 6] 
 
From the QDR we can begin to see the growing concern for the strategic/tactical 
reach that biological agents possess.  Addressing the strategic level, the coupling of 
biological agents to missile technology could be misleading given the examples of recent 
anthrax attacks in the U.S.  The QDR’s recognition of America’s susceptibility to being 
surprised by military-technical trends is a revelation that a “hiders/finders” concept of 
biological warfare capabilities could lead to significant security threats in the future.  
Biotechnology is providing the conduit for the proliferation of a knowledge base from 
which biological warfare agents can be generated. 
 
2. Improved Security Environment for Bio-weapons 
The equipment, techniques and education required to conduct offensive biological 
research and development have never been more easily accessible than today.  The 
internet abounds with information that could be utilized by terrorists (state sponsored or 
non-state sponsored) to initiate a program.  Most techniques and procedures for 
manipulating microorganisms are taught in universities around the globe.  In addition, the 
U.S. government Freedom of Information Act is another tool that actors could utilize to 




C. THE OFFENSE-DEFENSE BALANCE AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS 
Utilizing an offense-defense model to characterize the implications of biological 
weapons is a useful tool in examining the threat posed by the proliferation of 
technologies capable of creating these weapons.  In an offense-defense model, biological 
agents might be recognized as an improvement in firepower and would thus logically 
favor the defensive10 [Ref. 7].  Biological agents have been a controversial weapon of 
mass destruction.  As a weapon, biological agents require conditions to be met to acquire 
optimal dispersal for maximum efficacy.  In addition, contagious agents pose a special 
problem of spreading epidemics to unintended targets.  However, biological agents offer 
two characteristics that lead to its appeal in the current security environment:  stealth and 
effectiveness.  Historically most engagements that have involved biological agents, 
agents were utilized in an offensive capacity.  This offensive capacity through history 
was eloquently detailed in Germs as: 
 
…the importance of scientific breakthroughs in the history of war:  the 
dramatic results when offensive capabilities had outstripped defensive 
measures.  The introduction of iron weapons, for instance, had made 
bronze weapons ineffective.  Gunpowder had made the defensive armor of 
medieval knights obsolete.  Horses and cavalries had enabled Asians to 
sweep through Europe.  And now the offensive capability of germs as 
bioweapons seemed to be outstripping defenses against them.  Germs 
…were “strategic” weapons that could strike deep into the nation’s 
heartland.  Such attacks could be attempted by states, terrorist groups they 
supported or lone actors.  “Individuals can make war with these new 
weapons”.  To counter such attacks, antiviral drugs and therapeutics were 
needed.  So were new vaccines based on new technologies. [Ref. 8] 
 
The implications of biotechnology and warfare would thus lead one to believe that 
the offensive nature of biological weapons would far outweigh the defensive nature of 
medical treatment.  Medical treatments are only useful against known agents and are 
completely reactionary to developing conditions.  Current technological developments do 
not allow for a more proactive defense against biological weapons; however the 
biotechnology revolution is trying to change this view. 
                                                 
10 See Keir A. Lieber, “Grasping the Technological Peace,” International Security 25 (2000) 71-104. 
8 
1. The Threat of Biotechnology 
The ability to alter the genetic make-up of an organism (human, plant, 
microorganism, or virus) poses a significant responsibility on the scientific and medical 
communities.  The proliferation of biotechnology and the implications it poses for 
societies around the world is forcing national and international organizations to develop 
governance structures to regulate the biotechnology industry11.  The implication of the 
duality of biotechnology is a danger that threatens societies around the world.  
Biotechnology has produced “miracle” drugs that fend off diseases such as diabetes, 
vaccines that have controlled disease such as small pox and promises to radically 
improve our ability to alter the genetic make-up of a human being to combat genetic 
disorders.  In contrast, biotechnology can also be used to improve organisms that are 
harmful to humans.  Producing organisms that could be utilized in a biological warfare 
capacity is difficult to detect and can be easily mistaken for defensive research. 
Revelations from the former Soviet Union on the extent of its biological weapons 
program have alarmed the world.  In his book Biohazard, Ken Alibek, a former Soviet 
scientist from Biopreparat12, details many projects in the Soviet Unions biological 
warfare program that used genetic engineering to enhance the performance of biological 
agent such as anthrax, small pox, marburg, and tularemia.  In his revelations Alibek tells 
us that the Soviet Union placed an emphasis on utilizing advances in biotechnology in 
making biological agents immune to vaccines, antibiotics, and making the agents more 
stable in the environment. 
 
2. Cause for Offensive Dominance 
Biotechnology is not symmetric when one talks about offensive and defensive 
biological warfare.  With regards for biological warfare, biotechnology favors the 
creation of biological agents over the creation of defenses against those agents (offense 
over defense).  The reason for this is related to the complexity of the two biological 
                                                 
11 Francis Fukuyama, “How to Regulate Science,” Public Interest 146 (2002): 3-22. 
 
12 Biopreparat was a civilian branch of the Soviet Unions clandestine, offensive biological warfare 
program. 
9 
systems involved; the biological agents and the human subjects.  The main hindrance to 
bio-defense measures is that all of the current countermeasures involve a more complex 
biological system: the human body.  Current science and technology allow for a greater 
range of research among less complex biological system such as bacteria, fungi, 
rickettsiae and viruses.  In contrast, research on humans is highly controversial and often 
requires months and or years of debate, research and development.  In addition, 
biological warfare offers several advantages to an offensive use: stealth of delivery, 
inexpensive to produce, potential for selectivity and minimum infrastructure required for 
production. 
 
3. Countermeasures to Biotechnology Threat 
The U.S. perception13 of an imbalance in the offense-defense model has lead to 
policy initiatives to bring the perceived imbalance into equilibrium.  The Biological and 
Toxin Weapons Convention is one avenue that the U.S. has tried to impress on the 
current security environment.  Another measure taken by the U.S. was an initiative to 
study and map genomes of various organisms.  This initiative is an effort to better 
understand the processes by which biological systems interact.  By studying microbial 
genomes, scientists hope to obtain genetic signatures for identification of pathogenic 
organisms and potentially lead to improved vaccines and antibiotics that would assist 
medical personnel in defending against a biological warfare event as well as an 
epidemiological event.  Studying the human genome has implications for many aspects of 
preventive medical measures, including disease prevention and immune enhancement.  
These initiatives by the United States have led the world in biotechnology innovation and 
scientific discovery.  The United States has staked its claim as a pioneer in biotechnology 
for the sake of humanity (medical role) but risks the potential of late modernizers to 
surpass its technological superiority and strike out ahead on their own. 
 
 
                                                 
13 Judith Miller, Stephen Engleberg and William Broad, GERMS: Biological weapons and Americas Secret 
War (New York:Simon & Schuster, 2001) 61-69. 
10 
D. IMPETUS FOR THESIS 
Upon examination of an offense-defense model of biotechnology in warfare and 
given the historical impact biological warfare has had on societies a review of current 
biotechnology governance practices is a must.  The sharing of information pertaining to 
biotechnology in an open forum, such as the internet is one facet of the governance 
problem that I have chosen to examine.  Scientific contributions to warfare have shaped 
societies and will continue to be a delicate balancing act for nations.  After all, as Harvard 
Professor Matthew Meselson has stated,  
 
Every major technology—metallurgy, explosives, internal combustion, 
aviation, electronics, nuclear energy has been intensively exploited, not 
only for peaceful purposes but also for hostile ones……Unlike the 
technologies of conventional or even nuclear weapons, biotechnology has 
the potential to place mass destructive capability in a multitude of hands 
and, in coming decades, to reach deeply into what we are and how we 
regard ourselves. [Ref. 9] 
 
The issue at hand is to examine levels of access to human “omatigence”14 
research for further biological study that does not hinder progress or give away methods 
for unintended use.  An evaluation of information management strategies is the purpose 
of this thesis, to examine preventive measures for disclosing sensitive technologies and 
knowledge to potential adversaries.  I will seek to explore the current research being 
conducted and/or funded by the Human Genome Project and its related Projects in order 
to identify areas of information sharing/dissemination that create a potential for the 
generation/improvement of biological warfare agents. 
My choice for utilizing the Human Genome Project results from the concern 
among many security professionals15 about releasing too much scientific information into 
an environment where no controls are placed on who is reviewing potentially sensitive 
materials.  The Human Genome Project is also a good case to examine the pressures 
involved in management of a project that lead to critical decision-making in one of three 
areas:  scientific progress, business marketing, and national/global security.  The Human 
                                                 
14Term taken from CDR Shaun Jones meaning “a fusion of omics and informatics and intelligence”   
11 
Genome Project is a clear case in which all three of these elements (science, business and 
security) come into the purview of a government-managed program with serious 
implications for the proliferation of dual-use technology. 
 
E. OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
The remainder of this thesis will follow the format below: 
 
1. Chapter II, Theoretical Framework 
In this chapter I will discuss the tensions between information policies of 
openness and guardedness and discuss the three paradigms (scientific, business, security) 
as a developing factor for information sharing paradigms. 
 
2. Chapter III, The Human Genome Project 
In this chapter I will discuss the plans and goals of the HGP.  I will use the three 
paradigms developed in chapter 2 to compare the benefits of scientific discoveries to-date 
and the concerns for biological misuse. 
 
3. Chapter IV, Sensitivity Analysis 
In this chapter I will discuss the case study by describing the problem of 
proliferating “dual use” technology.  I will compare actual events and benefits that have 
come from the program to potential pitfalls in proliferation.  Also, I will discuss the issue 
of self-promotion in relation to scientific discovery and the implications to societies. 
 
4. Chapter V, Policy Implications 
In this chapter I will make recommendations to improve the release of 
information regarding sensitive technologies and provide concluding remarks on the 
difficulty of regulating dual use technologies. 
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II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
A. PARADIGMS LOST 
In order to evaluate the utility of sharing information pertaining to biotechnology 
in an open forum, I will propose a theoretical model.  This model will aim to demonstrate 
the forces that have lead to the current information sharing practices of the Human 
Genome Project.  Ultimately the model will seek to become an objective process to judge 
the benefits of information sharing versus the costs associated with the use of that 
information for an unintended or unethical purpose as a result of sharing.  One must also 
establish the purpose for the establishment of an information-sharing framework and then 
examine the consequences that arise from this information framework.  This thesis 
examines the framework of information sharing through the “lens” of three paradigms 
that have played an integral role in developing the purpose for this framework of 
information sharing in the Human Genome Project.  A paradigm is defined in Webster’s 
Dictionary as:  a philosophical and theoretical framework of a scientific school or 
discipline within which theories, laws, and generalization and the experiments performed 
in support of them are formulated.  For the purposes of this thesis the “scientific 
discipline” refers to information science. 
The Human Genome Project is a very unique case study in that it is a government 
managed project that manages and cooperates with scientific laboratories worldwide that 
ultimately support a global industry (biotechnology).  The purpose of the HGP is to better 
understand the biological processes of the human body (and other organisms) for the 
purpose of advancing medical procedures that would save and possibly extend life.  This 
purpose reveals a program steeped in scientific research.  The quest for answers posed by 
science continues to push the boundaries of how we understand who we are and what is 
our relationship with the environment that surrounds us.  In addition, the result of this 
scientific research leads to the development of products that benefit all of mankind.  In a 
free market world where globalization defines a nation’s economic and political affairs, 
competition for product development becomes a powerful impetus for innovation and 
becomes a driving factor to carry on the quest for better products. 
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Of the three paradigms examined in this thesis two are self evident from the 
defined purpose stated previously.  The scientific information-sharing paradigm (quest to 
better understand the biological process) advocates the free exchange of information for 
the purpose of increasing the knowledge base by which problems can be solved.  The 
business information-sharing paradigm (advancing medical procedures that would save 
lives and possibly extend life) advocates a limited sharing of information within a free 
market environment to enhance competitive practices while avoiding monopolistic 
practices.  The third paradigm examined by this thesis is not as evident in the theme of 
the Human Genome Project but is a significant concern in today’s information age.  The 
security information-sharing paradigm advocates placing limitations on information 
exchange for the protection of an organization and society as a whole.  I discuss each 
information-sharing paradigm below 
 
1. Scientific Paradigm 
The scientific community’s free exchange paradigm serves as an outstanding 
instrument of cooperation in attacking complex problems.  One of the most celebrated 
examples of this paradigm in action is the discovery of the BRCA1 gene in 1994.  This 
gene, found in a mutated form, was linked to an 85 percent chance of developing breast 
cancer and a 50 percent chance of developing ovarian cancer in women with the defective 
gene [Ref. 10].  This discovery was assisted by the sharing of information that would lead 
two competing laboratories to rapidly assimilate the information into techniques that 
would lead to the ultimate discovery of the BRCA1 gene.  The discovery of this gene 
would lead to the development of medical tests that could detect the defective gene in 
women who were assessed as being at risk.  While the result of the information-sharing 
did not produce a product that could accurately predict whether a woman would actually 
develop breast or ovarian cancer it has proven a useful tool in improving the lives of 
those women who have been identified as having the defective gene by allowing those 




2. Business Paradigm 
The business information-sharing paradigm serves to keep companies on the edge 
of development while at the same time limiting competitors from incursions that would 
eat into profits.  This information-sharing paradigm is best illustrated in the fierce 
competition for gene patenting in the biotechnology industry.  In 1992 Agracetus (an 
American biotechnology company) received a patent for all genetically engineered cotton 
plants.  The patent was for the process of genetically engineering cotton plants.  This 
patent was filed and granted in four cotton-producing countries that lead to a virtual 
monopoly held by Agracetus in these countries, eliminating the import of new cotton 
varieties. [Ref. 11]  While the result of this information-sharing paradigm seems to clash 
with the ‘fair play’ desired by business it is a powerful impetus for competition among 
corporations to produce a unique product in order to fill a niche in a market for profit. 
 
3. Security Paradigm 
The security information-sharing paradigm is perhaps the most controversial in a 
society that covets the free exchange of ideas and free speech.  In April 1998, senior U.S. 
intelligence officers, including FBI Director Louis Freeh and CIA chief George Tenet, 
raised an alarm about materials the Environmental Protection Agency planned to post on 
the internet.  The EPA was preparing to make available information about more than 
60,000 sites where chemicals are stored and potential worst-case accidents that could 
happen at the sites.  A confidential risk report warned that making the information 
available to the public would increase seven fold the risk of a terrorist attack. [Ref. 12]  
While the result of this information-sharing paradigm has implications on the forum in 
which information is released it requires an intense vigilance to support and maintain 
over a period of time. 
 
B. SECRET TO SCIENTIFIC INNOVATION 
There is no secret to scientific innovation.  From the very beginnings of the 
biotechnology revolution (circa 1944, with the realization that DNA was the molecule 
responsible for heredity) scientific innovation has taken place as an evolutionary process 
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through the ‘normal science’ of biotechnology.  Thomas Kuhn defines normal science as 
“research firmly based upon one or more past scientific achievements that some 
particular community acknowledges for a time supplying the foundation for its further 
practice [Ref.  13].”   
In Kuhn’s essay The Structure of Scientific Revolution he illustrates the 
development of a scientific field based on an event he calls a scientific revolution.  The 
secret to scientific innovation is best described by utilizing this scientific revolution 
concept to understand that science as we know it is not as objective as we might be led to 
believe.  Science as we know it is merely a series of paradigms that support a discipline 
to an end point (a crisis) that requires a revolution (or paradigm shift) of ideas to continue 
to assist scientists in explaining the world around them.  Yet this revolutionary cycle that 
is required is an extremely competitive period that seeks to persuade various factions 
within a discipline towards acceptance of a particular paradigm.  The quest to understand 
biological processes led to the development of techniques from many scientific 
communities to study organisms.  This culmination of techniques would lead scientists to 
a crisis concerning the very substance of life itself. 
For the field of biotechnology this scientific revolution was initiated by Johann 
Miescher and set into motion by Fred Griffith and solidified by Oswald Avery.  In 1869 
Johann Miescher discovered molecular DNA, in 1928 Fred Griffith revealed that 
hereditary molecules could be isolated, in 1944 Oswald Avery correlated DNA with 
hereditary properties.  These revelations are the basis for which the normal science of 
biotechnology (solidified by Avery) is based.  It has been the scientific revolution of 
DNA that has led the science of biotechnology to what it is today. 
The establishment of biotechnology as a science is not an exact statement.  
Biotechnology is a culmination of techniques drawn from various scientific fields that 
work towards the same goal:  to use the properties of living things to make products or 
provide services [Ref. 14].  This is the junction by which the scientific paradigm and 
business paradigm interface: products and services.  While the science of biotechnology 
is to continually seek out answers to questions about us and our environment, it is 
intimately linked to the business of biotechnology.  If science produced information that 
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did not serve a useful purpose, would that science prove useful and thus continue as an 
endeavor worthy of following? 
 
C. SECRET TO BUSINESS EFFICIENCY 
Business practices within the field of biotechnology have experienced a wide 
range of controversial issues.  Issues that call into question ethics, morality, fair business 
practices and national security.  However, in a global economy that favors capitalistic 
practices, corporations are viewed as the ideal organization for innovation in society.  In 
his book The Role of Business in Society, John Diebold discusses the role of corporations: 
 
Competitive enterprise possesses a dynamism and ability to innovate that 
bureaucracies divorced from markets do not possess.  Despite its faults, 
the profit-seeking enterprise provides the best mechanism we have for 
spurring efficiency in resource allocation, for encouraging innovation and 
application of resource in entirely new modes, and for securing the 
transference of resources to new product lines.  Indeed, the dynamics of 
the market and feedback control through profit-not corporate form or 
management techniques-make profit enterprise the most effective 
innovator and resource allocator we have ever invented.  For society to 
benefit from this much-needed ability to fulfill human needs, it is the 
social responsibility of business to pursue profit.  The task of government 
is to establish incentives and constraints in such a way that profit is made 
during what society most needs done, in a manner society finds 
acceptable.  Good corporate citizenship is not enough….the bigger 
dangers have come when business has cooperated as a “good corporate 
citizen” with government, and especially when it has cultivated its public 
relation with either politicians or the intelligentsia-because then sometimes 
monopoly has been allowed. [Ref.  15] 
 
This view of corporations as a tool for the betterment of society is a good model 
to consider the ramifications of business decisions in the biotechnology industry.  The 
bottom-line for any corporation in a capitalist environment is profit.  John Diebold warns 
against allowing business’ to “do the right thing” of their own accord if social concerns 
are at stake.  Diebold also warns against close cooperation between government and 
business, claiming that if not left to natural market influences monopolistic regimes could 
stifle growth and innovation. 
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In biotechnology there is no more controversial topic than the role of business, 
especially with regard to gene patenting.  The business requirement for the patenting of 
genes is vital from the perspective of the biotechnology industry.  Companies argue that 
they need the protection of a patent to repay the cost of their research and development.  
It typically takes several years and millions of dollars to bring a biotechnology 
application to market.  Companies aim to restrict other researchers in the same field, slow 
progress and divide the industry by seeking patents in broad areas (concepts, a technique, 
or a group of plants or animals). [Ref. 16]  However, the private ownership of genetic 
materials is a volatile issue in societies around the world.  Diebold’s warning against 
trusting business to be a good citizen without outside influence is an issue that has many 
people concerned for the exploitation of biological processes that could have a 
detrimental effect on society (all within the legal context of a patent law). 
Thus, society’s mistrust of business as a ‘good citizen’ and government’s 
dependence on the innovation inherent in business play an interesting role in the 
development of an industry.  The business of biotechnology has forced societies around 
the world to involve themselves in debating the issues that have arisen from the science 
of biotechnology.  This involvement can only be useful if held in an open environment 
where free speech is allowed to develop the policies required to regulate the use of 
scientific information for profitable purposes that are a reflection of the demands and 
concerns of a population. 
 
D. NO SECRET TO SECURITY GUARDEDNESS 
The security paradigm that I present in this chapter is essentially an abstract form 
of information operations.  Information operations can be a form of national power that 
use information content and technology as strategic instruments to shape fundamental 
political, economic, military and cultural forces on a long-term basis to affect the global 
behavior of governments, supra-governmental organizations and societies.  This type of 
national “information power” can be defined in terms of military and governmental (and 
private sector) actions to control and exploit the strategic information environment across 
the conflict spectrum. [Ref. 17] 
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This kind of information operation could be utilized in an information warfare 
capacity should information be utilized against members of the international HGP 
members.  Information warfare is defined by Dorothy Denning as: 
  
….offensive and defensive operations against information resources of a 
“win-lose” nature.  It is conducted because information resources have 
value to people.  Offensive operations aim to increase this value for the 
offensive while decreasing it for the defense.  Defensive operations seek to 
counter potential losses of value. [Ref. 18] 
 
To elaborate on the relation between the information sharing paradigm and 
information warfare utilizing Denning’s model, open-source information concerning a 
dual-use technology has an operational value.  This operational value is open-source 
information pertaining to the HGP is of equal value to actors who intend to use the 
information for defensive or offensive biological purposes.  However, it is the 
comparative value of the end products as a result of the information shared that most 
concerns security professionals. 
The concept of information as a component of national power requires an 
environment for information to exist in.  This information environment according to Dr. 
Dan Kuehl of the National Defense University consists of two realms:  the physical and 
the contextual.  In the case of an open-source information resource the contextual realm 
of information is the most relevant.  Herein lies the challenge of dual use technologies.  
As a matter of national security, the science of biotechnology is a grave concern for many 
scientists and security professionals, yet for the intended purpose of its use it is equally 







































III. THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 
A. THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 
The HGP was initiated in October 1990 for the purpose of mapping the human 
genome in order to serve as a stepping-stone for improvements in medical techniques 
for treating diseases.  The mission of the HGP is stated as: 
 
The U.S. Human Genome Project (HGP), composed of the DOE and NIH 
Human Genome Programs, is the national coordinated effort to 
characterize all human genetic material by determining the complete 
sequence of the DNA in the human genome.  The HGP's ultimate goal is 
to discover all the more than 30,000 human genes and render them 
accessible for further biological study.  An ambitious schedule has been 
set to complete the full sequence by the end of 2003.  The Human Genome 
Program supports research projects at universities, the DOE Joint Genome 
Institute, DOE and NIH-owned national laboratories, and other research 
organizations.  As part of the international Human Genome Project, vital 
and very active genome research is being pursued by researchers and 
science funding agencies outside the United States. [Ref. 19] 
 
The Office of Biological and Environmental Research (OBER) within the 
Department of Energy and the National Human Genome Research Institute (NHGRI) 
within the National Institute of Health handle administration of the program.  In 1987 
three genome research centers were established at Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos and 
Lawrence Berkeley, which were all subsequently merged into the DOE Joint Genome 
Institute.  International efforts have also played a critical role in the project's success, 
with at least 18 countries now supporting programs for analyzing the genomes of a 
variety of organisms ranging from microbes to economically important plants and 
animals to humans. 
The HGP has already identified single genes associated with various genetic 
disorders.  The HGP also helped to spawn multiple DOE and NIH follow-on programs to 
continue the goal of mastering the biological processes that control life as we know it.  
Perhaps the most significant impact the Human Genome Project has played in the overall 
mission to map the human genome is the coordination of technology development for 
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scientific research.  The HGP has also played a major role in bringing about an “economy 
of force” among research facilities and private sector companies through information and 
program management.  The study of life at the most basic level has spurred many debates 
about the privacy, ethics, and the legality of genetics in society.  To study the effects of 
the HGP, DOE and NIH established an ethical, legal, societal implications research fund. 
Projects such as the Microbial Genome Project, Microbial Cell Project, Genomes 
to Life Project, and the Human Genome Diversity Project were all spin-offs of the HGP 
that would take the next step in developing a better understanding of how genes 
interacted inside the nucleus of the cell and what the mechanism for gene expression was. 
 
1. The Microbial Genome Project 
The Microbial Genome Program's goal is to completely sequence the genomes of 
microbes, primarily bacteria. However, unlike the massive human genome, which is 
taking multiple years to complete, many microbial genomes can be completely sequenced 
in weeks or months. Through the study and understanding of a diverse group of microbes, 
solutions are nearer for challenges in environmental cleanup, medicine, agriculture, 
industrial processes, energy production and use, and biological nonproliferation 
(understanding and detecting biowarfare agents), to name a few.[Ref. 20]  The MGP was 
initiated in 1994 to sequence the genomes of environmentally and industrially interesting 
microbes.  The U.S. Department of Agriculture, the National Science Foundation and the 
private sector, in addition to the DOE and NIH, conduct research in this field. 
 
2. The Microbial Cell Project 
The purpose of the Microbial Cell Project is to determine and characterize the 
minimum set of genes and corresponding gene products necessary to sustain a simple 
free-living microbial cell, express the genes to produce the relevant proteins, and 
determine their structure [Ref. 21].  The MCP takes a whole-genome approach to 
understanding the function and regulation of all genes for a single living system and the 
pathways in which the protein products interact.  The MCP's ultimate aim is to learn 
enough about cellular functions so they can be manipulated knowledgeably to enhance 
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beneficial and suppress unintended effects [Ref. 22].  The initiation of the MCP was to 
provide a stepping-stone for the Genomes to Life Project. 
 
3. The Genomes to Life Program 
The Genomes to Life (GTL) program will take the logical next step:  a quest to 
understand the composition and function of the biochemical networks and pathways that 
carry out essential processes of living organisms. [Ref. 23]  The GTL program was 
initiated in 1999.  The Office of Biological and Environmental Research and Office of 
Advanced Scientific Computing Research in the U.S. Department of Energy cooperate on 
the research in the GTL program.  The GTL program focuses on:  identifying the protein 
machines that carry out critical life functions, characterizing the gene regulatory networks 
that control these machines, exploring the functional repertoire of complex microbial 
communities in their natural environments to provide a foundation for understanding and 
using their remarkably diverse capabilities to address DOE missions, and developing the 
computational capabilities to integrate and understand these data and begin to model 
complex biological systems. [Ref. 24] 
 
4. The Human Genome Diversity Project 
The Human Genome Diversity Project aims to compare the genetic material of 
scores of remote, isolated native population around the world, in the interests of 
understanding human history and migration [Ref. 25].  This project would lead to a 
fundamental understanding on genetic differentiation among humans that will prove 
critical in identifying genes. 
 
B. PARADIGM INTERACTION 
As I have stated previously the HGP is a unique program due to its foundation in 
publicly funded research and support of an industry.  All three of the paradigms discussed 
in chapter II (scientific, business and security) play an integral role in developing the 
existing framework for sharing information.  However, it is the weight of these three 
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paradigms as the basis for the current policy towards information sharing that I intend to 
address in the following chapters. 
In his book Cracking the Genome: Inside the Race to Unlock Human DNA, Kevin 
Davies illustrates the interaction of these three paradigms in his telling of the events that 
lead to the development of the HGP to its present day form.  The foundation for the HGP 
(as previously stated) was based on the need to understand biological processes for the 
benefit of mankind.  This telling story of the development of the HGP as a scientific 
venture that led to a marriage with commercial industry is an example of a scientific 
project that lead to an explosion of new technologies and discoveries that lead to a 
profound impact on an industry and society as a whole.  The successes of the HGP are a 
testament to human innovation and cooperation, however, the knowledge produced and 
the form that knowledge is released in are a concern of many security professionals as 
well as of scientists in the field of genetics.  The scientists involved in the HGP were 
aware of the ramifications of their research for good and ill, and the media form that they 
chose for the release of information is the topic that most concerns this thesis.  The 
sensationalization of discoveries and eagerness to educate a population to a level of 
understanding for the appreciation of the research drew attention (perhaps unwanted 
attention) to the possibilities of biotechnology.  When confronted with the prospect of 
biological warriors utilizing their ground-breaking techniques, reaction from the scientific 
community was one of concern yet confidence in the abilities of their techniques to 
provide sufficient defenses against biological threats. 
 
1. Scientific-Business Paradigm Interaction 
A great deal of the basic knowledge underlying biotechnology was developed 
using public funding.  The scientific information-sharing paradigm coexists with the 
business paradigm to provide useful services to society.  Science produces a technique or 
product that is marketed by business for profit in a supply and demand economic model.  
This feedback mechanism of supply and demand translates into a scientific progress 
report for the effectiveness of research programs.  However, within the business and 
scientific communities there is a tension over intellectual property.  Technological 
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innovations and gene patents required by business create possessiveness about basic 
information, reducing the relatively free exchange of ideas and data traditional among 
scientists [Ref. 26]. 
 
Science operates according to a “market” of its own, one that has rules and 
values different from those of commercial markets.  While protection of 
intellectual property may concern a scientist who is writing a textbook, 
that same scientist, publishing a paper in a scientific journal, is motivated 
by the desire to propagate ideas, with the expectation of full and open 
access to the results.  To commercial publishers (including many 
professional societies), protection of intellectual property means protection 
of the rights to reproduce and distribute printed material.  To scientists, 
protection of intellectual property usually signifies assurance of proper 
attribution and credit for ideas and achievements.  Generally, scientists are 
more concerned that their work be read and used rather than that it be 
protected against unauthorized copying. [Ref. 27] 
 
2. Scientific-Security Paradigm Interaction 
The scientific and security paradigms can be viewed as opposing ends of an 
information-sharing spectrum.  During the Clinton administration the Human Genome 
Project (HGP) was seen as a key element in the United States ability to level the playing 
field against biological warfare agents. [Ref. 28]  However, this hope for bio-defense 
measures was also tempered by the fear of their use in offensive biological warfare 
agents.  In fact, from a security perspective, defensive biological warfare has become a 
critical area of concern highlighted by the anthrax attacks in the U.S. following the 
September 11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center. 
 
3. Business-Security Paradigm Interaction 
Gene patenting (discussed previously) is utilized by business to protect their 
investment into a particular scientific innovation.  This guardedness towards a product is 
aimed at creating a niche for business in a particular field by disallowing competition, or 
at a minimum increasing a competitive advantage in a market.  As illustrated in the 
previous chapter, business exists for the security of a corporation and not for the security 
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of the population at large.  In this respect, business must have boundaries defined for its 
operation within a national security context. 
 
C. IMPETUS FOR “SCIENTIFIC” INNOVATION 
Scientific innovation is the heart of the organization that is the HGP.  The very 
design and purpose of the HGP has been to facilitate scientific innovation in order to reap 
the benefits of scientific discoveries.  By creating an administrative adhocracy 
organizational structure16 among several nations the member nations have committed to a 
project for the betterment of mankind.  Yet this noble cause is targeted at a problem so 
complex that the search for new technologies to accomplish the research required has 
dominated the project to date.  With an estimated 100,000 genes (later revised to 30,000) 
to discover and study, research to date has concentrated on the technologies to improve 
research in correlating of genes to a particular function. 
Two problems were identified that would have to be addressed to meet the 2005 
target date for sequencing the entire human genome: first, construction of a complete 
physical map17 of each chromosome and second, improvements in sequencing 
technology.  In order to handle the first problem, the scientific information-sharing 
paradigm came to the fore.  In 1996 all major genome institutes in the public domain 
committed to The Bermuda Accord (developed at the first International Strategy Meeting 
on Human Genome Sequencing held in Bermuda).  The Bermuda Accord states “All 
human genome sequence information should be freely available in the public domain in 
order to encourage research and development to maximize its benefit to society.” [Ref. 
29]  This open forum for information sharing would assist genomic research institutes in 
coordinating the sequencing of over three billion base pairs of DNA.  The second 
problem was tackled by genomic institutes and later outsourced to the private sector.  
This outsourcing of technologies would lead to competition, coveted by free market 
economies, within the biotechnology industry.  
                                                 
16 Mintzberg, Henry, “Organization Design:  Fashion or Fit?,” Harvard Business Review, 59, 112, January-
February 1981. 
17 A physical map is a map of the locations of identifiable landmarks on DNA (e.g. restriction enzyme 
cutting sites, genes), regardless of inheritance.  The highest resolution map would be the complete 
nucleotide sequence of the chromosome. 
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From the start, HGP planners anticipated and promoted the private sector's 
participation in developing and commercializing genomic resources and applications. The 
HGP's successes in establishing an infrastructure and funding high-throughput 
technology development have given rise to commercially viable products and services, 
with the private sector now taking on more of the risk.  Substantial public-sector research 
and development investment often is needed in feasibility demonstrations before such 
start-up ventures as those by Celera Genomics, Incyte, and Human Genome Sciences can 
begin.  In turn, these companies furnish valuable commercial services that the 
government cannot provide, and the taxes returned by their successes easily repay 
fundamental public investments18.  The HGP’s commitment from the outset has been to 
create a scientific standard (an entire reference genome).  Most private-sector human 
genome sequencing projects, however, focus on gathering just enough DNA to meet their 
customers’ needs probably in the 95% to 99% range for gene-rich, potentially lucrative 
regions. Such private data continue to be enriched greatly by accurate free public 
mapping (location) and sequence information. [Ref 30]  
 
D. SOME IMPLICATIONS 
Science and ethics exist in tension.  The bulk of scientific research is after all 
focused on the “how can we do something” or the “what would happen if we did 
something.”  Rarely is the question asked “should we do this?”  Recognizing that the 
struggle to resist one disease or another will always be with us, like death itself, what is 
the goal of medicine?  How does biotechnology help that goal?  The overriding approach 
of biotechnology is to control or fix whatever threatens ill health.  It tends to emphasize 
high-tech intervention and the search for cures. [Ref. 31]  
The complete human genetic sequence will reveal the fundamental properties of 
all human genes, allowing their functions and interactions to be integrated into a 
miraculously complete picture of human biology and evolution.  In the same way as the 
building blocks of chemistry were uncovered 130 years ago thanks to the work of 
                                                 
18 The idea of a public good is addressed in John Diebold, The Role of Business in Society (New York: 
AMACOM, 1982). 
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Mendeleyev, Newlands, and others, biology too is on the verge of becoming finite19. 
[Ref. 32]  This finite future in biology has serious implications for biological warfare in 
general.  From a biological warfare perspective, Steven Block details various properties a 
scientist might attempt to develop within a pathogen utilizing finite scientific techniques, 
these include:  Safer handling and deployment; Easier propagation and/or distribution; 
Improved ability to target the host; Greater tansmissivity, infectivity; More difficulty in 
detection; Greater toxicity, more difficulty in combating; and Self-limiting/Self-
enhancing. [Ref. 33] 
For medicine the finite future of biology will provide equally beneficial 
implications by improving detection, diagnosis, and preventive measures.  The promises 
of gene therapy, microbial research, and immunological research cast a promising future 
for the health care industry.  Research directly related to the HGP has already produced 
detection procedures for several genetic diseases that have improved the lives of 
countless people.  The future not only holds the potential for more detection procedures 
but also the possibility of correcting genetic deficiencies at the root cause, the DNA 
inside us. 
All of the genome sequence generated by the HGP has been deposited into public 
databases freely accessible by anyone with a connection to the Internet.  Disseminating 
information in the public domain encourages widespread use of information, minimizes 
transaction costs, and makes research and development cheaper and faster.  Of particular 
relevance to research science, a vigorous public domain can supply a meeting place for 
people, information, and ideas that might not find each other in the course of more 
organized, licensed encounters.  Information in the public domain is accessible to users 
who otherwise would be priced out of the market. [Ref. 34] 
Global diffusion of biotechnology is a serious matter for the potential of 
biological warfare.  The U.S. could be seen as a major proliferator of biotechnology in 
the global market.  The book Bits of Power: Issues in Global Access to Scientific Data 
illustrates how the U.S. has accomplished this proliferation status. 
                                                 
19 Reference to “finite” science is given by Eric Lander:  “The Human Genome Project aims to produce 
biology’s periodic table-not 100 elements, but 100,000 genes: not a rectangle reflecting electron valences, 
but a tree structure, depicting ancestral and functional affinities among the human genes.” 
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Freedom of inquiry, the full and open availability of scientific data on an 
international basis, and the open publication of results are cornerstones of 
basic research that U.S. law and tradition have long upheld. For many 
decades, the United States has been a leader in the collection and 
dissemination of scientific data, and in the discovery and creation of new 
knowledge.  By sharing and exchanging data with the international 
community and by openly publishing the results of research, all countries, 
including the United States, have benefited.  In this century’s dramatic 
growth of scientific knowledge—an expansion motivated by a 
combination of forces including military, commercial, public benefit 
(especially health), and purely intellectual—a necessary component has 
been the wide availability of scientific information, ranging from 
minimally processed data to cutting-edge research articles in newly 
developing fields.  This information has been assembled as a matter of 
public responsibility by the individuals and institutions of the scientific 
community, largely with the support of public funding. [Ref. 35] 
 
This sharing and dissemination of scientific data has led to incredible growth of the 
biotechnology industry over the past 10-20 years.  This spread of scientific knowledge 
and technical equipment across the globe has taken root in private, educational and 
military programs.  Scientists have expressed concern for the potential misuse of 
biotechnology but continue to train students (national and foreign) in the most 
sophisticated biotechnical methods.  The danger inherent in this diffusion of 
biotechnological knowledge is illustrated in the concern over former Soviet Union bio-
weaponeers that could potentially sell their services to nations seeking to implement a 
biological warfare program.  [Ref. 36] 
In this chapter I have attempted to illustrate the forces that have shaped the 
current information management structure of the HGP.  In so doing I have highlighted 
that of the three information sharing paradigms the security paradigm is the least 
influential in the development of a scientific information exchange apparatus.  This 
inattention to the guardedness of biologically sensitive information is not a failing of U.S. 
security professionals but is a result of the narrowly focused goals of the HGP and the 
scientists engaged in scientific research towards its goal.  The task set forth by the HGP is 
vast, yet the organization of the project has allowed for a rapid build up of technologies 
to assist scientist in deciphering the human genome.  With the successes of their 
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accomplishments coming to fruition, should the administrators and scientists of the 

















IV. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
A. FOR THE GOOD OF ALL MANKIND 
The results of the Human Genome Project will revolutionize treatment of human 
illnesses by facilitating development of new medical products and processes.  The 
following excerpt gives a good understanding of just how revolutionary medical products 
and processes will become: 
 
Analysis of the draft human genomic sequence has already led to the 
identification of genes for cystic fibrosis, breast cancer, hereditary 
deafness, hereditary skeletal disorders, and a form of diabetes--just to 
name a few.  The draft sequence has also been used to identify an 
enormous number of single base variations in the genetic code that play a 
significant role in the disease process.  These discoveries, as well as future 
discoveries, will have a profound impact on the future conduct of 
biomedical research.  The translation of basic science advances into the 
clinical arena promises to revolutionize the practice of medicine.  In the 
coming years, clinicians will be able to help their patients in ways they 
never thought possible.  Physicians will be able to rapidly diagnose 
existing genetic diseases; pre-determine genetic risk for developing a 
disease; design novel therapeutic agents for the treatment and prevention 
of disease, rather than the treatment of the underlying symptoms; and 
prescribe a medical intervention based on a person’s genetic information, 
reducing the chance of an allergic, or otherwise detrimental, drug reaction. 
[Ref. 37] 
 
Biotechnology has pushed the boundaries of our understanding of nature and 
human biology.  Future benefits from research due to the HGP will be in the fields of 
molecular medicine, microbial genomics, risk assessment, bioarchaeology, anthropology, 
evolution, and human migration, DNA forensics (identification), agriculture, livestock 
breeding, and bioprocessing [Ref. 38].  The most significant of these areas of interest 





1. Molecular Medicine 
Improvements in molecular medicine will assist medical professionals to 
diagnosis disease, detect genetic predispositions to disease earlier, improve drug design, 
improve gene therapy, and start the field of pharmacogenomics ("custom drugs").  This 
field will enable medical professionals to better treat the causes of human illness. 
 
2. Microbial Genomics 
Improvements in microbial genomics will assist scientists in myriad ways, such as 
bioremediation, potential energy sources and understanding disease vulnerability.  This 
field will allow scientist to better understand the world of microorganisms and use that 
understanding to produce benefits for society.  For this thesis the main benefit evolving 
from this field is the protection against biological agents. 
 
3. Risk Assessment 
Improvements in understanding the human genome will lead to risk assessment 
measures that will allow for early identification of genetic disease.  In addition, the 
understanding of genomics will give scientists insight into how disease functions within 
the human genome. 
 
B. RESULTS OF A DECADE 
Developments of sequencing technology and techniques have made a significant 
impact on the cost and speed of developing a complete map of the human genome20.  
With the rapid development of sequencing technology, the HGP was able to readjust its 
target date of 2005 to 2003.  This technological triumph is due to the scientific sharing of 
information, which led to an economic model of competition and innovation.  The great 
promise of the HGP era21 will be a result of the implementation of two of the three 
                                                 
20 The cost of sequencing a single DNA base was about $10 then (1990); today, sequencing costs have 
fallen about 100-fold to $.10 to $.20 a base and still are dropping rapidly.  See 
[http://www.ornl.gov/hgmis/project/privatesector.html] 
21 Functional Genomics study of the function of genes.  Structural genomics study of 3D structure of 
proteins in order to describe function.  Proteomics study of protein expression. 
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paradigms I have proposed (science and business).  The third, (the security paradigm) 
could have an effect in the chronology of scientific developments in the HGP era. 
The scientific information-sharing paradigm has led to the development of 
powerful tools to “spread the word” of Human Genome Project’s research efforts on the 
internet.  These tools are designed for people with no familiarity of the scientific 
processes involved in genomic research and genomics researchers alike.  Tutorials assist 
in understanding technologies and the science behind genomic research22.  In addition, 
search engines that assist in touring the draft sequence of the human genome contain 
significant information pertaining to genes of interest.  Sites such as the Human Genome 
Project Information website23 contain an extensive amount of information about the 
status of human genome research and tools available for public use to understand and use 
the information available, free of charge.  This information distribution system is truly 
remarkable in the amount of scientific data and information pertaining to the human 
condition. 
Sites that lead you directly to The Institute for Genomics Research24 (TIGR) and 
the National Center for Biotechnology Information25 (NCBI) contain powerful software 
tools that allow anyone to browse the human genome as it has been sequenced to-date26.  
GenBank is the NIH’s sequence database maintained by the NCBI that stores the 
sequence data generated by the centers involved in the HGP.  GenBank is one of three 
databases that make up the International Nucleotide Sequence Database collaboration27.  
All three institutions work together to make the sequence data generated by the Human 
Genome Project rapidly and freely accessible to scientific communities worldwide. [Ref. 
39]  In addition to supporting scientific communities these databases serve biotechnology 
                                                 
22 Human Genome News, To Know Ourselves, DOE Primer on Molecular Genetics, and others See 
[http://www.ornl.gov/TechResources/Human_Genome/home.html] 
23 See [http://www.ornl.gov/TechResources/Human_Genome/home.html] 
24 See [http://www.tigr.org/tdb/] 
25 See [http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/] 
26 TIGR nonprofit research center setup by Craig Venter and Wallace Steinberg for the purpose of 
supplying sister companies with marketable DNA sequenced data to biotech companies.  NCBI is a 
subdivision of the NIH and is a resource for molecular biology information, NCBI creates public databases, 
conducts research in computational biology, develops software tools for analyzing genome data, and 
disseminates biomedical information 
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corporations as well.  The success of Celera Genomics28 is due in part to the openness of 
public genome information.  In addition to groundbreaking technological advances in 
sequencing technology and procedures29, Celera Genomics was able to incorporate 
publicly funded genomic data into their operations but was able to selectively restrict 
information it deemed proprietary out of the company’s genomic database.  
The business paradigm has given an impetus for the development of private 
industry in the field of genomics and biotechnology.  The affects of gene patenting have 
had a profound impact on private interest in developing significant products from 
genomic information.  The beginnings of this genomic marketplace were a key factor in 
developing the sequencing technologies required by the HGP to accomplish the mission 
of completing the sequence of the human genome by 2005.  Gene patenting has allowed 
private industry to begin to take over some of the cost associated with research and 
development.  Genetic sequencers such as the ABI PRISM 3700, MegaBACE 1000, SCE 
9600 and the CEQ 2000 have been instrumental in reducing the cost associated with 
DNA sequencing--a critical hurdle from the very beginning of the HGP.  In addition, the 
high throughput of this new generation of sequencing technology has spurred business 
into developing software and databases capable of storing, manipulating and 
disseminating the raw data produced by the HGP.  Genome informatics is playing a 
larger role in the biotechnology industry.  Genome informatics tools such as BLAST, 
PHRED and PHRAP30 are instrumental in continuing the scientific information paradigm 
to a higher level of collaboration. 
The security paradigm is not well thought of among scientists in general.  After 
all, international collaboration enhances scientists’ capacity to better understand the 
natural world and thus strengthens the science base that is a source of important benefits 
to society [Ref. 40].  Restricting flows of information would result in inefficiency among 
                                                                                                                                                 
27 NCBI's partners in this effort include the European Bioinformatics Institute in the United Kingdom and 
the National Institute of Genetics in Japan.  In addition, the Genome Database in the United States and the 
the European Molecular Biology Organization contribute to this genetic database management scheme. 
28 A leading corporation in genomics founded by ex-NIH scientist Craig Venter. 
29 Celera was the first genomics laboratory to receive ABI PRISM 3700 automated DNA sequencers 
developed by PE Applied Biosystems, a sister corporation to Celera Genomics.  In addition, Celera 
Genomics President, Craig Venter, was responsible for the latest sequencing procedure, the shotgun 
procedure. 
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scientific programs that would ultimately stifle innovation and bog down industry.  This 
would be a major blow to many spin-off projects of the HGP.  The HGP has managed to 
generate a decentralized pool of knowledge that has spawned projects reliant on the 
current information-sharing apparatus.  The ethical, legal and societal implications and 
potential for the misuse of biotechnology in the international community, coupled with 
the rapid expansion of scientific knowledge in these fields require an examination of risk 
involved in proceeding with current information management practices. 
Biotechnology corporations have a different view of the security paradigm.  
Corporations must incorporate some element of guardedness in order to maintain a 
foothold in their industry.  Without a security strategy, corporations would stand to lose 
millions of dollars in research and development if a competitor beat them to or produced 
a better product based on the same information.  Once again, gene patenting plays a 
major role in creating a framework by which business can practice guardedness towards 
information for the benefit of producing goods. 
 
C. THE RIGHT THING TO DO 
Genomic research is a powerful tool.  The process of studying a genome can be 
full of discoveries and surprises.  Take the case presented in Germs of an Australian lab 
that discovered the effects of introducing the gene responsible for interluekin-4 
production.  In attempting to make mice infertile as a part of a pest-control project 
scientists used gene therapy to insert a mouse gene for regulating interleukin-4 that 
ultimately proved deadly for the mice in the experiment.  The vector chosen was 
mousepox, a cousin of smallpox, and the addition of the regulatory gene produced 
immunity to vaccinated mice.  This shocking result was attributed to the interluekin-4 (an 
immunity enhancer) gene shutting down the cellular arm of the mice immune system, 
rendering them unable to fight mousepox31.  Of course this revelation was a concern for 
biological warfare professionals, due to the relation of mousepox to smallpox, this 
technique (publicly published) could circumvent the smallpox vaccine.  [Ref. 41]  This 
                                                                                                                                                 
30 Computer algorithms that have become standard tools for analyzing DNA sequence data. 
31 “The Bugs of War,” Nature, 411, 17 May 2001, p. 235 
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example of the potential of genomic research is a taste of what discoveries lay ahead of 
us, both intentional and unintentional. 
The rapid expansion of biotechnological techniques and knowledge are 
outstripping society’s ability to adjust to the new revelations.  This rapid expansion will 
continue to hamper society’s ability to provide the necessary guidance scientists require, 
in a timely manner.  The Department of Energy has realized the impact of information 
inherent in the results of the HGP:  
 
While human genome research itself does not pose any new ethical 
dilemmas, the use of data arising from these studies presents challenges 
that need to be addressed before the data accumulate significantly.  To 
assist in policy development, the ethics component of the HGP is funding 
conferences and research projects to identify and consider relevant issues, 
as well as activities to promote public awareness of these topics. [Ref. 42] 
 
DOE and NIH have devoted 3% to 5% of their annual HGP budgets to studies of 
the project's ethical, legal, and social implications32.  The Joint DOE-NIH ELSI program 
covers four program areas: (1) privacy and fair use of genetic information; (2) clinical 
integration of genetic technologies; (3) ethical issues surrounding genetic research; and 
(4) education and resources.  DOE narrowed its ELSI scope to concentrate on genetic 
education, the privacy and fair use of personal genetic information, and genetics and the 
workplace.  DOE supports peer-reviewed studies on the uses, effects, and implications of 
personal genetic information in various settings; its ownership, access, and protection in 
computerized databases and tissue and sample archives; and commercialized products of 
genome research.  NHGRI’s ELSI program also has been focused primarily on funding 
research and education projects, but was expanded and enhanced in the mid-1990s with 
the creation of two complementary entities: the Office of Policy and Public Affairs and 
an Intramural Office of Bioethics and Special Populations Research [Ref. 43].  DOE's 
goal is to democratize Human Genome Project information and make sure it is distributed 
widely. [Ref. 44] 
                                                 
32 See [http://www.ornl.gov/hgmis/resource/elsiprog.html]. 
 
37 
Despite the overall strength of the ELSI research programs and their grant 
portfolios, there are some weaknesses.  Specific content gaps exist in each of the 
portfolio’s four program areas and there are a number of emerging issues–such as 
behavioral genetics, genetic enhancement techniques, and other emerging technologies 
(such as fetal cell sorting, pre-implantation genetic diagnosis, and the ability to test for 
adult onset disorders in children or even in the prenatal period)–that will require 
additional attention in the coming years. [Ref. 45]  Regarding the Joint DOE-NHGRI 
self-proclaimed deficiencies in ELSI, fields of study such as vaccines, microbial research 
gene therapy and immunology pose significant concerns for elected policy makers with 
regards to duality.  These fields pose questions relating to genetic enhancement 
techniques and emerging technologies mentioned previously. 
 
1. Vaccines 
In general, vaccines are wonderful. They have made a huge change in the world 
over the past two hundred years. They are perfect for protecting against many infectious 
diseases.  What is different with biological weapons is that they can be based on a huge 
number of different biological agents (approximately 70 different types).  Vaccinating 
somebody against 70 different infectious agents is virtually impossible from the health 
standpoint, the financial standpoint, and the scientific standpoint. [Ref. 46] 
 
2. Microbial Research 
The debate on whether to post microbial sequences on the internet or cloak them 
in secrecy has smoldered behind the scenes for years. "It's a question that still comes up," 
… raised by Department of Defense (DOD) scientists who worry that the information 
will find its way into the wrong hands. [Ref. 47]  Proponents of the ongoing microbial 
genomic sequencing project back unfettered research and scientific openness, asserting 
that the same advances that may put more people at risk of germ warfare attacks also 
promise to accelerate critical research into the detection, prevention and treatment of 
germ-warfare agents. [Ref. 48] 
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3. Gene Therapy 
Gene therapy is perhaps the most promising technique for curing genetic 
disorders in the future.  The ability to permanently alter the genetic make-up of an 
individual (somatic cell gene therapy33) or to alter germ line cells (germ line gene 
therapy34) poses significant hope in combating and potentially terminating undesirable 
genetic mutations for individuals or future generations respectively.  This ability could 
also be used to replace DNA in favor of a malignant gene.  Much of gene therapy 
research is focused on utilizing “mother nature’s” machinery:  Viruses.  The use of 
viruses to introduce DNA into an individual is very effective, viral vectors have evolved 
for this specific purpose for centuries.  While this technology is still in its infancy the 
potential for its use as a cure or disease should be a great interest to public debate. 
 
4. Immunology 
Advances in our understanding of the human immune system will play a vital role 
in developing counter-measures against diseases (naturally occurring or man-made).  In 
addition, the knowledge accumulated could lead to incidents, such as the mousepox 
example previously, that could lead to potentially dangerous organisms. 
 
D. THE INFORMATION PERSPECTIVE 
The bottom-line is that the HGP is big business as well as big science.  The 
deluge of data and related technologies generated by the HGP and other genomic 
research presents a broad array of commercial opportunities.  Seemingly limitless 
applications cross boundaries from medicine and food to energy and environmental 
resources, and predictions are that life sciences may become the largest sector in the U.S. 
economy. [Ref. 49]  Any attempt to stifle the availability of information would meet 
fierce resistance from scientists and business.  This big business environment was 
enabled by the rapid expansion of government investment through the HGP (see Figure 
                                                 
33 Somatic cell gene therapy seeks to alter the genes of cells in an individual, this would repair damage in 
the individual alone. 
34 Germ line gene therapy seeks to alter the genes of the sex cells in an individual, this would allow for the 
avoidance of genetic defects in future generations. 
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1).  This investment has in turn produced dividends through improvements to the HGP in 
areas critical to the continuation of research.  No other area has been impacted more than 
sequencing technologies (See Figure 2)35. 
 



























Figure 1.   Funding for the U.S. Human Genome Project. From Ref. [50] 
                                                 
35 Base pairs are two nitrogenous bases (Adenine and thymine or guanine and cytosine) held together by 
weak bonds, these bases make-up the double helix of a DNA that we call a chromosome.  A sequence is the 
order of base pairs in a DNA molecule.  See Department of Energy: Human Genome Project, Primer for 
Molecular Genetics (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1992). 
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Figure 2.   Growth of GenBank (1982-2000). From Ref. [51] 
 
The biological revolution has been largely a success due to the sharing of 
scientific information for the purpose of exploiting that information to produce products 
in a free market economic model for the benefit of society.  The HGP is at the center of 
this biological revolution.  The HGP is by no means the root cause of this revolution but 
it has been a critical catalyst in the development of technologies that have advanced our 
understanding of basic biological processes.  Once these processes are unleashed into our 
society they cannot be retracted.  Herein lies the danger of the biological revolution.  The 
dual-use nature of biotechnology is a concern that must be addressed in order to ensure 
security of mind and body in the international community. 
 
The features that make these technologies different—and that make their 
effects orders of magnitude greater than those of other technologies that 
have emerged in the past 50 years (with the possible exception of nuclear 
weapons)—also make the effects of their abuse potentially greater than 
those of other technologies.  Yet, the level of control that is in the hands of 
the individual makes social governance much more complex than for 
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technologies that require collective action to build, use, or maintain.  The 
problem that emerges is no longer to ensure democratic control over a 
large and complex centralized system but rather to determine how much 
governance is necessary for a decentralized, distributed system and how 
society can accomplish this goal. [Ref. 52] 
 
Advances in biotechnology have created gaping holes in the existing regime for 
the regulation of human biomedicine, which legislature and administrative agencies 
around the world have been racing to fill [Ref. 53].  The paces by which discoveries and 
innovation are developing are a great concern for the diffusion of biotechnological 
expertise throughout the world.  The spread of recombinant knowledge through scientific 
exchanges and commerce has given even modestly skilled scientists the means to create 
havoc [Ref. 54].  Yet, the benefits of full and open access to scientific data in the 
information age are a force to be reckoned with.  So we come full circle in trying to 
answer the question: what is the effect of government information management policies 
on the release of information regarding developing technologies via open source 
channels? And, what effect has government information management policy towards 
cooperation with private industry and the international consortium had on the spread of 
dual use technologies? 
Perhaps the best solution to the questions posed by this thesis is expressed in the 
following statement: 
 
Based on its deliberations and understanding of the issues involved, the 
committee36 believes that the following overarching principle should guide 
all policy decisions concerning the management and international 
exchange of scientific data in the natural sciences: The value of data lies in 
their use.  Full and open access to scientific data should be adopted as the 
international norm for the exchange of scientific data derived from 
publicly funded research.  The public-good interests37 in the full and open 
                                                 
36 “committee” refers to Committee on Issues of Transborder Flow of Scientific Data, U.S. National 
Committee for CODATA, Commission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics, and Applications, National 
Research Council. 
37 A class of economic good that refers to a product or service possessed of certain properties that lead to 
collective consumption or production, rather than private consumption or production. A public good is 
characterized by two attributes, nondepletability and nonexcludability (nonappropriability). See Bits of 
Power in List of References (p. 112) 
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access to and use of scientific data need to be balanced against legitimate 
concerns for the protection of national security, individual privacy, and 
intellectual property. [Ref. 55] 
 
The Human Genome Project is a program that requires an international exchange 
of scientific information.  In this capacity the HGP is a tool for proliferation of a 
technology with a potential for mass destruction (or mass disruption).  Currently, there 
are no intellectual, political, or proprietary barriers limiting international access to and 
use of these data. The barriers are technical and economic. The most important technical 
barrier involves equipment and infrastructure limitations on potential end users’ 
capability to access and then make use of the wealth of information available. [Ref. 56] 
In the next chapter I will explore trends in policy to deal with the duality problem 
















V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
A. CURRENT TRENDS 
The following excerpt from the book Bits of Power can best describe the current 
trend in information sharing paradigms concerning the Human Genome Project: 
 
Basic scientific research fuels most of our nation—and the world’s—
progress in science.  Society uses the fruits of such research to expand the 
world’s base of knowledge and applies that knowledge in myriad ways to 
create new wealth and to enhance the public welfare.  Few people 
understand how scientific advances have made possible the ongoing 
improvements that are basic to the daily lives of everyone.  Fewer still are 
aware of what it takes to achieve advances in science, or know that the 
scientific enterprise is becoming increasingly international in character.  
Freedom of inquiry, the full and open availability of scientific data on an 
international basis, and the open publication of results are cornerstones of 
basic research that U.S. law and tradition have long upheld.  For many 
decades, the United States has been a leader in the collection and 
dissemination of scientific data, and in the discovery and creation of new 
knowledge.  By sharing and exchanging data with the international 
community and by openly publishing the results of research, all countries, 
including the United States, have benefited.  In this century’s dramatic 
growth of scientific knowledge—an expansion motivated by a 
combination of forces including military, commercial, public benefit, and 
purely intellectual—a necessary component has been the wide availability 
of scientific information, ranging from minimally processed data to 
cutting-edge research articles in newly developing fields.  This 
information has been assembled as a matter of public responsibility by the 
individuals and institutions of the scientific community, largely with the 
support of public funding.  [Ref. 57] 
 
The U.S. has taken the lead in publicly funding genomic research (see Figure 3).  
Appendix A displays a country and organizational funding chart of the overall 
international HGP effort from 1998 to 2000.  The efforts of the U.S. to produce scientific 
data for open and free dissemination, coupled with the financial effort has led to an 
explosion of genomic data made possible by the HGP, and the revolution in information 
technology.  Many scientists are having difficulty assimilating scientific data into 
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information that is useful in their research38.  The creation of new fields of science such 
as bioinformatics is an adaptation that the HGP has developed to assist in its goal of 
collecting and disseminating scientific data and information. 
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Figure 3.   Funding for the Human Genome Project (1998-2000).  From Ref. [61] 
 
Concerns over the rapid expansion and dissemination of information and 
knowledge about genomics research, and biotechnology in general, have led many 
security professionals to raise public awareness on the issue of regulation.  This call for 
                                                 
38 Data are being generated so rapidly that the database doubles in size every 12 months. See Bit of Power 
in list of references p. 212 
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public awareness has been drowned out by the sensationalization of the potential benefits 
for medical treatments projected by the HGP and other genomics research.  Until 
recently, the absence of a biological threat was been a significant factor in suppressing 
security concerns over biological warfare and biotechnology.  This has not deterred 
scientists, such as Ken Alibek, from contemplating the future of biological warfare and 
the challenges and rewards posed by the dual-nature of biotechnology: 
 
In the 20th century, countries interested in biological weapons mostly 
developed them as weapons of mass destruction, a means to conduct wars. 
In the 21st century, we will see a significant shift. Everything is going to 
be done covertly.  In some cases, biological weapons will be used in so-
called "low intensity" military conflicts, or they will be used [for 
terrorism], brought to the US and used to infect people in the subway, for 
example.…..Russia still retains a huge, sophisticated biological weapons 
capability and expertise. This is the actual threat: not from the 
government, but from Russians with the knowledge. Some of them want 
to sell their expertise and knowledge-there are many buyers.  The major 
concern is that in the event of a bioterrorist attack with well-trained people 
who know how to deploy biological weapons, the number of casualties 
would be unbelievably huge.  Depending on the type of agents, 
deployment techniques, concentration of the agent, from dozens to 
hundreds of thousands.  We need to take a very aggressive approach and 
start developing real protection against biological weapons. We need a 
special government board overseeing this work, which covers everything 
from detection, identification, protective garments and disinfection, to the 
organisational tactics of medical services, diagnostics issues, treatment, re-
treatment, and urgent prophylaxis. [Ref. 58] 
 
The current threat of biological warfare is real.  We have all seen the danger 
involved in a biological attack in the recent anthrax attacks in the U.S.  Since the U.S. 
dismantled its offensive biological program in 1969, the emphasis on a defensive 
program and a non-proliferation regime has been our main defense against the threat of 
biological agents.  The history of the absorption of technology into the operational and 
warfighting capabilities of the Department of Defense suggests a reason for our 
vulnerability to biological warfare.  World War I was a conflict that forced chemists and 
warfighters to talk with one another; World War II as a conflict that brought physicists 
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and warfighters together; the Cold War as a history of Pentagon investments in 
computers, electronics, and telecommunication skills.  But, this framework does not 
include events that led to the development and integration of biologists with the 
Pentagon. [Ref. 59]  I would also point out that the incorporation of doctors and scientists 
in our non-proliferation efforts is also a failing that we must address39.  “The common 
interests of all scientists, of science, and indeed of society in general are best served by as 
full and open an exchange of scientific information as possible, consistent with the 
preservation of scientists’ capacity to continue their investigations….Because the 
scientific community is not the only sector with an interest in the handling of scientific 
data and information, scientists need to remain involved in the current policy debate that 
will affect the prospects for continuing open, global access to scientific data.” [Ref. 60] 
As a response to the September 11 and anthrax attacks in the U.S., the President is 
taking steps that will significantly improve our ability to protect citizens against the threat 
of bioterrorism.  The President has proposed a 319 percent budget increase in FY 2003 
towards a defense against biological terrorism, an increase of $4.5 billion.  This new 
funding will focus on: strengthening the state and local health systems, including by 
enhancing medical communications and disease surveillance capabilities, to maximize 
their contribution to the overall biodefense of the nation; improving specialized federal 
capabilities to respond in coordination with state and local governments, and private 
capabilities in the event of a bioterrorist incident and build up the National 
Pharmaceutical Stockpile; meeting the medical needs of our bioterrorism response plans 
by developing specific new vaccines, medicines, and diagnostic tests through an 
aggressive research and development program. [Ref. 62] 
 
B. POTENTIAL FOR CONTROLS 
The impetus for monitoring dual-use biotechnology equipment, information and 
knowledge can be illustrated in a November 1, 2001 statement by President George W. 
Bush: 
                                                 




Disease has long been the deadliest enemy of mankind.  Infectious 
diseases make no distinctions among people and recognize no borders.  
We have fought the causes and consequences of disease throughout 
history and must continue to do so with every available means.  All 
civilized nations reject as intolerable the use of disease and biological 
weapons as instruments of war and terror. [Ref. 63] 
 
To-date most efforts to control biological weapons and biotechnology have 
produced a stream of international agreements and cooperative coalitions.  International 
attempts to stem biological warfare proliferation have focused either on suppliers or on 
self-disclosures and declarations.  The proliferation attempts by suppliers are conducted 
through the Australia Group.  The self-disclosure and declarations are conducted through 
the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC).  Both the Australia Group and 
the BWC have drawbacks.  The dual-use nature of equipment makes it difficult for 
suppliers to establish what equipment requires tracking and what does not.  The self-
disclosure and declaration protocol can be circumvented by claiming legitimate defensive 
research in biological agents. [Ref. 64] 
Participants in the Australia Group do not undertake any legally binding 
obligations: the effectiveness of the cooperation between participants depends solely on 
their commitment to CBW non-proliferation goals and the effectiveness of the measures 
they each take on a national basis.  The participants in the Australia Group encourage all 
countries to take the necessary steps to ensure that they and their industries are not 
contributing to the spread of biological and chemical weapons.  Export licensing 
measures demonstrate the determination of AG countries to avoid involvement in the 
proliferation of these weapons in violation of international law and norms. [Ref. 65] 
Earlier this year, the U.S. rejected a protocol to the treaty that all other countries 
had agreed to, which would have made members exchange information and submit to 
inspections aimed at bolstering the ban on biological weapons.  Pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology companies objected to provisions that would allow random inspections of 
their facilities, fearing that commercial secrets would be compromised.  Proponents of 
stringent arms control were not satisfied with the time lag given to potential inspection 
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sites.  Any facility receiving a random visit would be given two weeks notice, so those 
involved in biowarfare could easily disguise their activities.  Even ‘challenge’ 
inspections, made following specific allegations that the convention had been breached, 
would allow a lag of 108 hours. [Ref. 66] 
Bolstering the BWC is critical because unlike other treaties it has no secretariat, 
no existence in the real world, apart from meetings of members.  The U.S. has asked 
countries instead, to call for inspections of suspicious disease outbreaks by the U.N.  It is 
also pushing for laws making possession of bioweapons illegal, and controls on 
biotechnology and pathogens.  But it opposes any continuation of talks among treaty 
members aimed at setting up anything like the rejected protocol40.  Third World 
countries, especially Iran and China, insist such talks must continue.  The European 
Union is trying to bridge the gap with a proposal that treaty members at least keep 
meeting annually to discuss common concerns, starting before next April.  The E.U. also 
wants members to set up working groups of scientific experts to monitor developments in 
biotechnology which could pose new threats, or new means of tracing or treating germ 
weapons. [Ref. 67]  The meeting ended with governments pledging to meet again next 
November, but making no other final declaration. 
These two non-proliferation agreements are the cornerstones of U.S. efforts to 
cease the proliferation of technologies related to the production of biological weapons.  
Other efforts to reduce this threat include the Russia-U.S.-U.K. trilateral agreement, 
signed in September 1992 that focuses on confidence building measures that promote 
transparency of each nation’s biological warfare capabilities.  In fact, confidence-building 
measures are a barrier that the BWC has been attempting to address since its inception41.  
The 1925 Geneva Protocol, ratified by U.S. April 10, 1975, prohibits the use in war of 
                                                 
40The US introduced a demand to abolish a mandate under which treaty members have been negotiating 
legally-binding compliance measures. See 
[http://www.newscientist.com/hottopics/bioterrorism/bioterrorism.jsp?id=ns99991667] 
41 In accordance with Article XII of the BTWC, Review Conferences have been held at approximately five-
year intervals since it entered into force in 1975. At the Second Review Conference of the BTWC in 1986, 
the States Parties agreed some measures intended to strengthen compliance with the Convention and to 
improve transparency. These were enhanced and extended at the Third Review Conference in 1991.  These 
confidence-building measures (CBMs) consist of annual exchanges of data and information, as well as 
declarations of past and present activities of relevance to the Convention. See 
[http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/btwc/cbms.html] 
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asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, 
and bacteriological methods.  Generally accepted as international law the Geneva 
Protocol does not apply to nations under attack by non-signatory states.   
 
C. INFORMATION STRATEGY 
A statement by former Secretary of State Madeline Albright gives perspective on 
how the U.S. government sees its role in the international community with regards to 
scientific knowledge.  “In a world being transformed by technology, good science is vital 
to good diplomacy...Whether the issue is countering weapons of mass destruction, 
dealing with infectious diseases, or expanding the global economy while protecting the 
global environment, if we are to get our international strategies right we must get our 
science right.” [Ref. 68]  This coupling of science with diplomacy is an important 
realization to understanding what is at stake with regard to the proliferation of 
biotechnology. 
In their book, The Emergence of Nooplotitik: Toward an American Information 
Strategy Noopolitik, John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt argue for “an articulated, 
integrated, U.S. information strategy” focused upon American national security [Ref. 69]. 
 
Strategy, at its best, knits together ends and means, no matter how various 
and disparate, into a cohesive pattern. In the case of an American 
information strategy, this requires balancing the need to guard and secure 
access to many informational capabilities and resources, with the 
opportunity to achieve national aims by fostering as much openness as 
practicable in the international system. Of course, an American strategy 
that supports a substantial amount of openness is sure to base itself on the 
assumption that greater interconnectivity leads to more liberal political 
development—an updated version of Lipset’s (1960) “optimistic 
equation,” which saw democracy moving in tandem with prosperity. Even 
so, it may be prudent to hedge against atavistic tendencies (e.g., 
information age totalitarianism) by means of continuing guardedness.  Our 




The concept posed by Arquilla and Ronfeldt is echoed by Dr. Dan Kuehl’s 
Information Power: A New Paradigm for National Security in the Interconnected Age42.  
The concept of information as a component of power is increasingly relevant to the 
diffusion of biotechnology and the threat it poses to national security.  As a leader in the 
dissemination of information it is incumbent on the U.S. to lead the international 
community in a regulation regime that addresses the information power inherent in 
biotechnology.  The U.S. must strive to bring the BWC into a more useful tool for the 
non-proliferation of dangerous technologies in the international community.  However, 
the U.S. must continue its national efforts to enhance medical communications and 
disease surveillance capabilities at the state and local community levels and impress this 
capability on the international community.  This creation of an epidemiological tracking 
network is seen by many security and medical professionals43 as being essential for 
identifying terrorist use of biological agents. 
 
D. CONCLUSION 
The challenge of biotechnology, where good and bad are intimately connected, 
presents a dilemma that must be dealt with.  Regulation of biotechnological 
developments and institutional oversight that will discriminate between those 
technological advances that further human flourishing, and those that pose a threat of 
human dignity and well-being are needed to ensure the public utility of these 
technologies is a must.  These regulatory institutions must have the power to enforce 
discrimination at a nation and, ultimately, an international level. [Ref. 71]  In order to 
accomplishing this regulation Dr. Fukuyama states: 
 
In proscribing an approach for the regulation of biotechnology… a lot of 
positive benefits will come from the biotechnology revolution; this is why 
we should pursue a regulatory approach rather than seeking to ban specific 
                                                 
42 Use of information content and technology as strategic instruments to shape fundamental political, 
economic, military, and cultural forces on a long-term basis to affect the global behavior of government, 
supra-governmental organizations, and societies to support national security.  See 
[http://www.ndu.edu/irmc/]. 
43  British Medical Association, Biotechnology Weapons and Humanity (Amsterdam: Hardwood 
Academic, 1999),  
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technologies.  But …"it is extremely important for the political community 
to lay down a marker that the people who determine the pace and scope of 
technological progress and development [are] not the scientific 
community, not the pharmaceutical industry, not the community of 
research scientists.  It is the democratically constituted political 
community that is sovereign over these issues."  Some people argue that 
globalization will make it impossible to control development in the field 
of biotechnology.  But international regulatory regimes begin with 
national regulations…and the first step is to focus on the national 
institutions that should oversee advances in biotech.  In some cases 
existing regulatory institutions, such as the Food and Drug Administration, 
may be able to deal with changing technologies, but in many other cases 
we will have to create new bodies that are prepared to take novel 
regulatory approaches. ….of the models currently in practice, formal 
regulation, not self-regulation, is the answer….in areas such as banking, 
those in industry can be left to agree upon standards among themselves, 
but the biotechnology industry will have no adequate incentives to 
regulate itself in ways that protect the public interest. [Ref. 72] 
 
Throughout this thesis I have wrestled with the inherently dual-use nature of 
biotechnology and have tried to develop a means to frame the problem posed by the 
biotechnology in an information environment.  By using the Human Genome Project as a 
case study, I have developed a framework by which regulation, or potential regulation, of 
biotechnology could be addressed.  Understanding the potential of biotechnology is only 
half of the problem.  Knowing how regulation will affect society and who should be 
involved in regulation (or even if regulation should be considered) is a question that 
should be addressed by the “consumers” of biotechnology products.  In today’s 
supercharged information technology environment biotechnology has become an 
international concern.  Biological warfare is only one issue that I have chosen to address, 
but the ramifications of the coming biotechnology revolution have an impact across the 
globe. 
Regulation is not the all-encompassing answer to the biotechnology threat.  In 
fact, the current regulatory regime is known to be faulty.  The former Soviet Union, Iraq, 
and potentially Iran are all known to have development of an offensive BW program 
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while having ratified the BWC44.  Regulatory regimes apply strictly to those nations that 
submit to the terms of the agreement.  The Australia Group consists of 34 countries.  This 
small number poses a problem for tracking technologies coming out of countries that are 
not a part of the Australia Group.  Appendix B is a listing of all nations currently 
involved in the Australia Group.   
In spite of the difficulties experienced in tackling the proliferation of 
biotechnology in the international arena the U.S. must continue to develop an effective 
non-proliferation regime.  In addition, the paradigm interactions posed in this thesis 
would point to a system of information sharing that would enable medical professionals 
to better cope with the potential use of biological agents.  At a minimum steps must be 
taken to ensure that medical personnel have the best information available to detect, treat 
and prevent the spread (intentional or unintentional) of disease.  Scientists involved in 
biotechnology, and genomics specifically, must take a lead in directing efforts to counter 


















                                                 





Genomics Research Funding 1998-2000 
In descending order of Year 2000 funding ($ US*) 
  
  1998 1999 2000 
Total 721,013,151 1,141,497,345 1,805,325,883 
National Human Genome Research Institute, NIH (USA) 210,891,000 270,733,000 326,391,000 
Genome Canada     152,542,373 
 
 
Wellcome Trust (UK) 61,273,006 103,511,450 121,406,728 
Science and Technology Agency (Japan)## 38,899,682 77,867,925 115,431,373 
Biotechnology&Biol Sci Res Council, UK 64,417,178 97,709,924 110,091,743 
European Commission 23,479,189 104,602,510 108,459,870 
National Science Foundation, USA 68,000,000 75,000,000 92,000,000 
US Department of Energy 85,500,000 89,800,000 88,900,000 
Ministry of Education, Sports, and Culture (Japan)## 31,025,468 31,427,673 84,398,693 
German microbial genomes&proteomics#     80,000,000 
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industy (Japan)^ 17,354,305 17,081,761 72,908,497 
Ministry of Health and Welfare (Japan) 16,474,026 16,094,340 65,359,477 
Netherlands genomics research#   40,000,000 60,000,000 
American Cancer Society (USA)   50,000,000 50,000,000 
Knut and Alice Wallenberg Foundation (Sweden) 5,000,000 11,000,000 35,000,000 
GenHomme Program, France#     26,000,000 
German Human Genome Project 19,900,498 20,202,020 23,195,876 
The SNP Consortium   28,000,000 22,000,000 
Cancer Genome Anatomy Program (NCI, NIH, USA)** 7,000,000 11,300,000 21,800,000 
Howard Hughes Medical Institute (USA) 20,000,000 20,000,000 20,000,000 
Kazusa DNA Research Institute (Japan) 14,800,000 14,500,000 14,400,000 
Imperial Cancer Research Fund (UK)     12,894,495 
Assoc contre les Myopathies (France)#     9,200,000 
Centre National de Sequencage Genoscope (France) 4,522,388 7,435,897 8,961,832 
Russian Genome Program^^ 2,783,100 5,382,471 8,286,800 
Korea Research Institute of Bioscience~     8,000,000 
Nat Center for Biotech Info, Nat Lib Med (NIH, USA) 3,500,000 5,800,000 8,000,000 
Merck Genome Research Institute (USA)*** 3,700,000 5,350,000 7,000,000 
Estonia Genome Foundation     6,941,665 
Ministry of Science and Technology, China^ 3,623,188 8,454,106 6,642,512 
Canadian Institutes of Health Research#$   3,331,794 5,925,620 
National Natural Science Foundation, China^ 2,415,459 3,623,188 5,434,783 
Flemish Genome Initiative, Belgium 5,000,000 5,100,000 5,200,000 
Environmental Genome Program (NIEHS, NIH, USA)   5,189,000 5,008,000 
Fondation Jean Dausset-CEPH (France) 6,316,916 5,603,448 4,956,616 
US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency     4,000,000 
National Institute of General Medical Sciences, NIH (USA) 3,000,000 3,200,000 3,500,000 
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Australian Genome Research Facility 610,687 1,615,385 2,213,740 
National Academy of Sciences, China^ 1,207,729 2,415,459 1,811,594 
Program in Medical Genomics, NHMRC (Australia) 319,331 165,993 862,595 
Swedish Medical Research Council     200,000 
  
^*from Genome Canada 2000-2001 annual report 
**Based on meeting with Robert Strausberg 7 September 2000. They include CGAP and the Genetic Annotation Initiative 
of NCI as well as some NIAID and other institutes' funds for the Mammalian Gene Collection. 
***Currency conversions made using Purchasing Power Parity, per OECD figures Feb 2001 update (see 
http://www.oecd.org/std/ppp/pps.htm, and PPP data table at p. 7 of http://www.oecd.org//std/ppp1.pdf), except China (not 
an OECD member; used UNSTATS currency conversion factor (exchange rate) instead. 
#Data contributed by Manuel Hallen, European Commission, using his currency conversions 
##STA and MESC (Monbusho) unified in 2000 to become Ministry of Education, Sports, Culture, Science and Technology 
(MEXT; Monbokagusho), but genome program budgets are shown here carried over from original ministries 
^Data contributed by Huanming Yang, Director of the Beijing Genomics Institute, 4 March 2001 
#$Canadian Institute of Health Research figures from Veeran-Anne Singh, 26 October 2001 
^^Data (in $US) contributed by Andrei Mirzabekov, Argonne National Laboraory (Illinois) and Englehardt Institute of 
Molecular Biology (Moscow) 17 May 2001 
***Merck's 1999 report on corporate philanthropy specifies "genome research" at $3.7M for 1998.  Figure for 2000 based 
on Mouse Genome Sequencing Consortium funding [$6.5M; http://www.mgri.org/grants.html#Consortium] and the 
Alliance for Cellular Signaling [$500,000; http://www.mgri.org/grants.html#Southwestern] so a slight underestimate, 
MGRI's two main grants; 1999 figure interpolated between 1998 and 2000 figures. 
Government figures from Japan (STA, MESC/MEXT, MITI, and MHW) forwarded by David Cyranoski, April 2001 
~Budget figures on Korea from Robert Triendl and Renee Yoon, "Growth of Genomics & Bioinformatics in Asia," Genetic 




Participating Members of the Australia Group 
 
Argentina Finland Luxembourg Switzerland 
Australia France Netherlands Republic of Turkey 
Austria Germany New Zealand United Kingdom 
Belgium Greece Norway United States 
Bulgaria Hungary Poland   
Canada Iceland Portugal   
Czech Republic Ireland Romania   
Republic of Cyprus Italy Slovak Republic   
Denmark Japan Spain   
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